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Abstract. Group communication is a programming abstraction that al-
lows a distributed group of processes to provide a reliable service in spite
of the possibility of failures within the group. The goal of the project was
to improve the state of the art of group communication in several direc-
tions: protocol frameworks, group communication stacks, speciﬁcation,
veriﬁcation and robustness. The paper discusses the results obtained.
1 Introduction
Group communication is a programming abstraction that allows a distributed
group of processes to provide a reliable service in spite of possible failures
within the group. Group communication encompasses broadcast protocols (e.g.,
reliable broadcast, atomic broadcast), membership protocols, and agreement
protocols.Group communication is a middleware technology, lying between an
application layer and a transport layer. Developing and maintaining a group
communication middleware is a non-trivial, error-prone and complex task. In
this context, the goal of the project was to improve the state of the art in sev-
eral directions: ﬂexibility, reusability, formalization, veriﬁcation and validation.
Due to space constraints, a detailed presentation of all the contributions was
not possible. The paper gives an overview of the results obtained, structured as
shown in Figure 1. Details can be found in the referenced papers.
Protocol frameworks: Flexibility and reusability of a middleware layer—and of
any piece of software—can be achieved by decomposing the middleware into
protocols that can be assembled. The glue that allows to assemble the protocols is
called a protocol framework. The features of a protocol framework are essential to
the protocol composer: they can make life more or less easy. Typically, adequate
features can reduce the errors at assembly time, i.e., when the protocols are glued
together to build a group communication middleware. Protocol frameworks are
addressed in Section 2, where we start by presenting the features of traditional
protocol frameworks, before presenting the novel aspects that have been designed
and implemented within the project.
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Fig. 1. Structure of the paper
Group communication stacks: A good protocol framework is essential to achieve
ﬂexibility and reusability, but is by itself not suﬃcient. It is also required to
identify the “right” components (or protocols). In the context of group com-
munication this is a diﬃcult task, because of the diﬃculty of the problems to
solve. Components derive from algorithms that solve these problems. In Section 3
we explain that the traditional architecture of a group communication middle-
ware has considered group membership as one of its most basic components. We
discuss the deﬁciencies of this choice and propose a diﬀerent architecture. We
believe that the new architecture has a much better chance to be ﬂexible, i.e., to
adapt to a changing environment. As a consequence, the components are much
more likely to be reusable.
Speciﬁcations: In group communication, formalization plays an important role
at two levels: (i) at the level of the speciﬁcation of the problems to be solved, and
(ii) at the level of solving these problems. At the speciﬁcation level, we need a
precise characterization of the desired properties of group communication prim-
itives or services. At the solution level, we need to characterize the assumptions
that allow us to solve the problems. These issues have been addressed in the past.
However, it is only for static groups and in the so-called crash-stop model (in
which processes do not recover after a crash) that speciﬁcations of group commu-
nication are widely accepted and agreed upon. Speciﬁcations for dynamic group
communication have been proposed, but they diﬀer signiﬁcantly from static spec-
iﬁcations, which is not satisfactory. In Section 4 we show that it is possible to
specify dynamic group communication in such a way that, if the group happens
to be static, then we obtain the well-known static speciﬁcations. We also address
speciﬁcations of group communication in the crash-recoverymodel (in which pro-
cesses have access to stable storage to save their state). Speciﬁcations for the
crash-recoverymodel have been proposed in the past, but they fail to capture the
fundamental diﬀerence between the crash-stop and the crash-recovery model. In
Section 4 we discuss how this issue can be addressed. Section 4 also addresses
an important formalization issue related to solving group communication prob-
lems. The concept of unreliable failure detectors has been introduced some time
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ago. The section proposes a fresh look at failure detectors by representing them
via transition systems (as known from operational semantics), with the goal of
bringing the deﬁnitions closer to our formal reasoning techniques.
Veriﬁcation and testing: Section 5 is devoted to veriﬁcation and testing. Con-
sensus is one of the most fundamental problems in group communication. Many
of the algorithms for solving consensus have been described in pseudo code, and
their proofs use concepts that are sometimes not rigorously deﬁned. Here, we pro-
pose a formal approach to the proof of a rigorously deﬁned consensus algorithm.
Finally, Section 5 describes an experiment conducted on our new Fortika group
communication middleware that was build within the project. Fault injection
has been used to study how Fortika reacts to memory and network corruption—
faults that Fortika was not designed to handle. The experiments allowed us to
identify a few weaknesses and to correct them. The result is a very robust group
communication middleware.
2 Protocol Frameworks
We ﬁrst present the most signiﬁcant existing frameworks. Then, we discuss some
novel ideas that advance the state of the art of protocol composition, covering
programming models, concurrency support and dynamic protocol update. Fi-
nally, we study languages to ensure the safe usage of concurrency support.
2.1 Existing Frameworks
Protocol frameworks are programming tools to build complex middleware out
of simpler oﬀ-the-shelf building blocks, called protocols. This modular approach
yields advantages such as customization, code reuse, extensibility, and ease of
maintenance. Altogether, this eases the implementation of group communication
middlewares (and, in turn, the implementation of fault tolerant applications).
Most of the existing frameworks are based on an event-driven programming
model. In such a model, a protocol is structured as a set of events, handlers,
bindings, and a state that can be private or shared with other protocols. Events
carry data and are triggered by protocols. The handlers contain the code of the
protocol and can modify the state and trigger events. A binding is a mapping
between an event type and one or several event handlers. When a handler triggers
an event, all handlers bound to its type are executed thereby possibly triggering
new events. Composing protocols consists in binding events of a protocol to
handlers of other protocols [14].
Cactus. Cactus [2] is an evolution of the x-kernel [4] protocol framework. Com-
position with x-kernel was strictly layered, i.e., a protocol could only communi-
cate with the protocols immediately above or below. Cactus introduces a ﬁner-
grain level of composition where several microprotocols can be assembled to
form an x-kernel protocol. Each microprotocol can communicate with any other
microprotocol in the same protocol using events.
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Cactus supports concurrent execution of its microprotocols. Concurrency in-
side composite protocols requires synchronization policies in order to preserve
the properties provided by the composite protocols. The C version of Cactus
oﬀers basic guarantees in the presence of concurrency, such as atomic execu-
tion of handlers. In the Java version of Cactus, however, it wholly depends on
the programmer, who must implement the required synchronization policy using
standard language facilities (such as locks, semaphores, monitors, etc...). This
approach, besides being tricky and error-prone, harms modularity, since a com-
poser has to adapt the code of the microprotocols composed in order to come
up with an adequate concurrency management.
Appia. Appia [1] is a re-engineering of the Ensemble group communication
toolkit [3]. In Ensemble, programmers can compose protocols in layered stacks
where there can only be one protocol per level in the composition. In contrast,
Appia allows more ﬂexible composition, where there may be several protocols
per level.
Appia features a validation check for composition. Every protocol declares
which event types it accepts, requires and provides. At composition time, Ap-
pia veriﬁes that all required events are provided by some protocol, rejecting all
compositions that do not pass this check. However, the fact that the direction
of events is not taken into account makes this veriﬁcation superﬁcial.
Unlike Cactus, Appia does not allow concurrent execution of protocols. All
events are dispatched by a single-threaded scheduler. This frees the protocol
programmer from the burden of dealing with concurrency, deadlocks, etc. How-
ever, this absence of concurrency prevents Appia from making the most of high-
performant systems (e.g., multi-processor platforms).
2.2 Novel Aspects
Our project brought up new programming abstractions that either improve over,
or provide an alternative to existing protocol frameworks. First we describe a
new header-driven programming model to program protocols in frameworks.
This model solves well-known composition problems of the event-driven model
and thereby enables the use of powerful composition languages (e.g. ml module
systems) to structure protocols and stacks. Then, we describe a runtime sys-
tem to support concurrency inside a protocol stack without the need to make
the protocols themselves aware of concurrency. Finally, we describe SAMOA—
a novel protocol framework that implements the runtime system, and provides
other interesting features such as dynamic protocol update.
A Header-Driven Programming Model. All recent frameworks use a
general-purpose event-driven programming model to manage interactions be-
tween protocols. However in complex compositions, where protocols oﬀer their
service to more than one protocol, the one-to-many interaction scheme of events
introduces composition problems by mixing up the targets to which data should
be delivered. In other words, protocols may receive events with data that is not
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targeted at them. This problem compromises the use of powerful composition
languages on top of an event-driven model, because ad hoc mechanisms need
to be introduced to “route” events to the right protocols. Moreover, the event
model doesn’t properly handle peer interactions, where a protocol interacts with
its peer running on another node by using the service of a lower-level protocol.
The way events handle this ubiquitous pattern is critical in three ways: (1) it is
complex, because invariants known at design time need to be enforced by the
composer; (2) it is obscure, because the indirections introduced by the events
hide, in the code, the logical structure of peer interactions; (3) it is unsafe, be-
cause misbindings can lead to runtime type errors or erratic behaviour. To solve
these problems we propose in [6] a novel and simple alternative that shifts the
driving force behind interactions from events to the headers (data) they carry.
In the event-driven model, protocols typically encapsulate communication
data for their peers in the messages and headers that are carried by events.
A message is a list of headers and a header is a typed container for data. Pro-
tocols often use a single event handler to manage the reception of messages.
Nevertheless, some protocols need to get diﬀerent kinds of data via this single
handler. In order to do so they introduce a tag name in the header to indicate
the kind of information being transmitted. Since a header usually remains inter-
nal to a protocol and its peers, it is not restrictive to impose that each header
shall be named and that each name shall be declared by at most one protocol
in a composition. A protocol composition satisfying these constraints has the
following interesting property. If we look at the names of a message’s sequence
of headers, we can approximately see the sequence of protocols—the route—that
will handle the message when it is processed by the composition of protocols.
In other words the message’s sequence of headers drives its processing in the
composition. The event model prevents us from exploiting this property. Thus
instead of having events at the core of our interaction scheme we should have
headers. This is the essence of our proposal.
The essential ingredients of a header-driven model are headers and messages.
As before, a message is a list of headers. But headers are named containers
carrying statically typed data. To construct a header, its name must be deﬁned.
A header handler deﬁnes a header name and associates a computation to the
deconstruction of every message that starts with this name. Message dispatch is
the interaction scheme, it deconstructs messages. When a message is dispatched,
the unique header handler corresponding to the head of the message is invoked
with the head’s data and the tail of the message as arguments. Compared to
the event model we can say that (1) header handlers replace event handlers, (2)
message dispatch replaces event triggering, and (3) the event binding mechanism
is dropped.
The resulting header-driven model has several advantages. It solves the com-
position problems of the event model, it simpliﬁes inter-protocol dependencies
and hence the task of composing protocols, and it concisely handles peer inter-
actions and explicitly reveals their logical structure (no binding indirections).
Moreover, the header-driven model provides better static typing, which avoids
Advances in the Design and Implementation 177
runtime type errors and erratic behaviours that can occur in the event model.
Our approach was validated by a proof-of-concept implementation [11].
Automatic Concurrency Control for Protocol Stacks. Implementing
atomic processing of concurrent messages in a protocol stack is notoriously hard
and error-prone. Atomic transactions can greatly help programming. Every fresh
message is processed by a new transaction with the guarantee of isolation—a
property known from standard ACID (Atomicity, Concurrency, Isolation and
Durability) transactions1. The usual implementation of atomic transactions de-
pends however on rollback-recovery—if some operations of concurrent transac-
tions conﬂict with respect to isolation, then the transactions are started again.
Rolling back some of the input/output (I/O) eﬀects is problematic, e.g. re-
sending messages that have been output to the network may confuse the dis-
tributed protocol. To evade this problem, we have designed rollback-free concur-
rency control algorithms for protocol frameworks [28]. The algorithms implement
runtime versioning and scheduling of transaction operations.
The basic idea of versioning is the following. Tickets (or versions) are assigned
to isolation-only transactions (called tasks) that allow them to acquire verlocks,
i.e., versioning locks protecting isolation-critical operations. On task creation, a
task obtains incremented version values for all verlocks that it wants. The task
can acquire a verlock only when the verlock’s counter has reached the version
count. The counters are monotonically increasing counters, one per verlock. The
counter is increased when the verlock has been released by a given task for the
last time.
In [28], we described three variants of versioning algorithms (Basic, Bound,
and Route), which diﬀer in the precision of detecting when verlocks are actually
requested for the last time. To detect this moment, upon a task creation, the
algorithms require some data about the task to be passed as the argument.
Diﬀerent variants of the algorithms can be characterized as follows:
– Basic: it gives an almost serial execution, however only verlock names must
be known a priori (they can be inferred statically, as described in Sec-
tion 2.3);
– Bound : it requires a least-upper-bound (supremum) on verlock access to be
known a priori ; in general, this variant allows for more parallelism than
Basic, but it performs like Basic if supremum cannot be reached;
– Route: it allows for even more parallelism than Bound, however it demands
a priori a complete tree of potential accesses to verlocks within scope of a
task, where a branch in the tree corresponds to a thread of execution.
The SAMOA Protocol Framework and Dynamic Update. We have
developed SAMOA, a novel protocol framework that improves over the exist-
ing protocol frameworks in two respects. Firstly, type-safe dynamic protocol
(re)binding guarantees that no runtime errors can happen due to protocol in-
teractions. Secondly, isolation-only, rollback-free transactions (or tasks) make it
1 This property is similar to atomicity in the programming language community.
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easier for programmers to encode concurrent protocols that may have irrevoca-
ble I/O eﬀects; the implementation of tasks uses concurrency control algorithms
described above. An experimental implementation of SAMOA as a package in
Java is available [20]. Some of the key features of SAMOA are the possibil-
ity to load protocols on-the-ﬂy and to dynamically bind and unbind protocols.
Based on these features, we have implemented eﬃcient mechanisms for dynamic
protocol update. The problem of dynamic protocol update has been addressed
in [27]. Essentially, we must guarantee global service availability and correct-
ness while a distributed update operation takes place. To validate these ideas,
we have implemented the Adaptive Group Communication (AGC) middleware
in which protocols can be replaced dynamically. The AGC middleware uses the
Fortika group communication protocols that supports both the crash-stop and
crash-recovery models (see Sections 3 and 4.1).
2.3 Language Issues
The use of isolated tasks in our implementation of SAMOA in Java is not safe,
i.e., the programmer must carefully determine and declare certain data about
tasks for the concurrency control algorithms to work correctly. Below we describe
the design of a safe programming language that removes this drawback.
Another problem with the existing protocol frameworks that support concur-
rency (such as SAMOA and Cactus) is that it is not possible to reuse protocols
that contain any synchronization constructs, such as spawning a new task, with-
out inspecting the code of these protocols (since these constructs may need to
be removed in the new stack). To remove this drawback, we have proposed to
separate the synchronization code and the protocol code. In the end of this
subsection, we discuss the design of two languages for this separation. These
languages could become an integral part of any future protocol frameworks.
Language Design For Isolated Tasks with I/O Eﬀects. To spawn a new
task, the SAMOA programmer uses a construct isolated R e, where e is a
concurrent, isolated task. In the simplest case (Basic versioning algorithm), ar-
gument R is just a list of service names that may be requested by the task e.
Unfortunately, a wrong argument R compromises safety (and therefore also cor-
rectness!). How could one make this construct safe for programmers? The idea
is to design a type system that can verify at compile time whether the argument
R is correct. A type system—implemented as part of the compilation tool—can
prove that any program execution preserves given properties expressed as types
(informally: “well typed programs can’t go wrong”).
In [26,25], we designed a typed language for expressing rollback-free transac-
tions (tasks) in modular protocols. It has a construct isolated R e to spawn
a new task e, where task expression e is executed by a new thread. Any return
result of this evaluation is ignored—the only visible outcome of task execution
are any data and I/O eﬀects. Any threads spawn by e are part of the same task.
The concurrent execution of tasks satisﬁes the isolation property. The argument
R in isolated R e is a list of verlock names. A new verlock x can be created
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with newlock x : m in e, where m is an eﬀect type of a single verlock. We
normally create a fresh verlock for each communication channel (I/O eﬀects),
and each data structure (memory change eﬀects). Verlocks can be shared by
concurrent tasks.
We can use verlocks in the expression sync e′ e. The expression has a se-
mantics that is roughly similar to synchronized in Java, i.e., expression e′ is
evaluated ﬁrst and yields verlock x (of type m), which is then acquired when
possible. Expression e is then evaluated to some v. Finally, the verlock is re-
leased and v returned by the whole expression. There is, however, an important
diﬀerence. What is a locking strategy? Or, when exactly the verlock x is ac-
quired when executing the expression sync x e? Verlock x of type m is acquired
when two conditions are satisﬁed: (1) the eﬀect m caused by e does not conﬂict
(with respect to isolation) with the eﬀects of other concurrent tasks, and (2)
lock x is free (i.e., the standard locking principle applies). The second condi-
tion is required just to avoid races inside a task; it can be dropped if tasks are
single-threaded.
In [26,25], we have deﬁned the iso-calculus, a typed call-by-value lambda calcu-
lus that is extended with threads, verlocks and tasks. It gives formal semantics to
the constructs described above. The iso-calculus has a type system that guaran-
tees that well-typed programs satisfy isolation. Programs that do not guarantee
isolation are rejected. Formally, the following type soundness theorem holds: if
expression e is typeable, then all terminating executions that evaluate (“com-
pute”) e to value v satisfy isolation. The type system essentially guarantees two
properties: (1) all operations that need to be isolated are protected by verlocks
(“no race conditions can happen”), and (2) all verlocks required by a task are
known before the task commences (“safe versioning”). It builds on Flanagan
and Abadi’s [10] type system for safe locking with singleton kinds. The formal
proof of the type soundness theorem for the iso-calculus appeared in [25].
Declarative Synchronization for Protocol Reuse. One of the promises of
modular protocol design is the reuse of protocol components in diﬀerent protocol
stacks. However, in practice, protocol reuse is problematic. Concurrent compo-
nents within a stack implement a synchronization policy. Reusing selected com-
ponents in a diﬀerent stack often requires to modify component code, so that it
implements a policy of the new stack. Unfortunately, this is a counterexample
to protocol modularity.
The above problem does not exist if we separate the synchronization and pro-
tocol code. Two approaches to such separation of concerns have been developed
within our project: (1) static [24], in which synchronization policy (that may
include isolation) is declared between components using concurrency combina-
tors, and (2) dynamic [23], in which synchronization policy is declared between
semantic roˆles using abstract types. In [24], we deﬁned a property, called com-
position safety, that informally means that any runtime execution of a protocol
can satisfy the synchronization policy declared using the language of concurreny
combinators. The main result of this work was to show that the property can be
veriﬁed statically, thus eliminating runtime errors due to wrong composition.
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3 Group Communication Stacks
Flexibility and modularity of a group communication middleware requires a pro-
tocol framework with the right features. However, this is not enough. Flexibility
and modularity requires also to identify the right components (or protocols).
In this section we ﬁrst point out common features of the most representative
group communication stacks implemented in the past. Then we describe the
new architecture of our new Fortika group communication stack, and explain its
advantages. A more detailed discussion can be found in [16].
3.1 Traditional Group Communication Stacks
In any group communication stack, atomic broadcast is one of the most funda-
mental communication primitives provided.1 However, there is not one single
way to implement atomic broadcast. The architecture of traditional group com-
munication stacks is shown on Figure 2(a). Their main characteristics are the
following:
Failure Detection
Network
Application
Atomic Broadcast
Group Membership
(a)
Group Membership
Atomic Broadcast
Consensus
Failure Detection
Network
Application
(b)
Fig. 2. (a) Traditional group communication stack, and (b) new group communication
stack
Group membership and failure detection are strongly coupled: Failure detection
is a low level mechanism that provides information (possibly incorrect) about the
status crashed/alive of processes in a group (see Section 3.2). This information
can be inconsistent, in the sense that two processes p, q might have a diﬀerent
perception of the processes in the group. On the contrary, the group membership
service provides a consistent view of the successive membership of the group (see
Section 4.1). In traditional architectures these two components are strongly cou-
pled: failure detection is a sub-component of the group membership component,
which acts as a failure detection for the rest of the system.
1 Atomic broadcast delivers messages to all processes of a group in the same global
order.
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Atomic broadcast algorithms rely on group membership: The traditional proto-
col stacks use atomic broadcast algorithms that require the help of the group
membership to avoid blocking in the case of the failure of some critical process.
Basically these algorithms operate in two modes, a failure-free mode and a fail-
ure mode. A notiﬁcation of removal of a process from the group (e.g., due to a
failure suspicion) leads the protocol to switch to the failure mode.
The consensus abstraction is barely used: The traditional protocol stacks have
not recognized the important role of consensus (see [21]) for solving agreement
problems, e.g., group membership, atomic broadcast. These stacks have group
membership (and not consensus) as their most basic component.
3.2 Fortika: The New Group Communication Stack
The architecture of Fortika, our new group communication stack, is shown on
Figure 2(b). Fortika’s protocols can be composed using several protocol frame-
works: Samoa, Cactus or Appia. The main diﬀerences in Fortika’s architecture
compared with the traditional one are the following:
Group membership and failure detection are decoupled: The strong coupling be-
tween failure detection and group membership in the traditional stacks was mo-
tivated by the atomic broadcast algorithms (see Section 3.1). Decoupling group
membership from failure detection has the following advantage: failure suspicions
do not necessarily lead to the costly process exclusion operation.
Group membership relies on atomic broadcast and not the opposite: Atomic
broadcast can be solved by a sequence of instances of consensus (see [21]). Such
a solution does not rely on a group membership service, and works without
blocking if no more than half of the processes in the group crash.
Since the group membership component does not need to be below the atomic
broadcast component, it can be placed above. This means that group membership
can be implemented using atomic broadcast, which is quite natural, since the
group membership service must deliver totally ordered views.
A consensus component is part of the stack: Since consensus plays a basic role
in a group communication stack, it should appear as one of the bottom most
component. Note that the consensus component requires the service of an (un-
reliable) failure detection component.
3.3 Assessment of the New Architecture
The two main advantages of the new architecture are the following.
Less complex stack: With traditional stacks, ordering is solved in two places: (1)
within the group membership component for views, and (2) within the atomic
broadcast component for messages. This is clearly not optimal, and introduces
unnecessary complexity. The redundancy disappears in the new architecture.
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Higher responsiveness: The performance of group communication must not only
be measured in failure-free executions, but also in the case of failures. In the case
of failures an important factor is the time needed to detect the failure (i.e., the
crash of a process). The critical factor is thus the time-out of failure detectors.
However, reducing the time-outs increases the probability of false suspicions.
Decoupling failure suspicions from process exclusion has a big advantage: (1) a
small value can be chosen for failure suspicion and (2) a large value for process
exclusion. The factor that inﬂuences the performance of atomic broadcast is the
short time-out value, and a wrong failure suspicion costs here very little. On the
contrary, the exclusion of falsely suspected process has a high overhead, which
can be avoided by choosing a large time-out value for exclusions.
4 Speciﬁcations
We discuss now more formal aspects related to group communication. We ﬁrst
address results related to the speciﬁcation of group communication primitives.
Here, we report on two contributions that each advance the state of the art, one
by providing original speciﬁcations in the sparsely investigated territory of the
crash-recovery model, and the other by revisiting and revising on speciﬁcations
in the better investigated ﬁeld of dynamic group communication. Finally, we
propose an improved speciﬁcation style for speciﬁcations, taking the example
of unreliable failure detectors, to bring the respective mathematical deﬁnitions
closer to our formal reasoning techniques.
4.1 Advances on Speciﬁcations in Reﬁned Computing Models
Various models have been considered for group communication, namely
static/dynamic groups, groups with benign/malicious faults, groups with crash-
stop/crash-recovery processes [21]. These models not only inﬂuence the im-
plementation of group communication, but also their speciﬁcation. The model
mostly considered in the literature is the static/crash-stop model with benign
faults. Simple and widely adopted speciﬁcations for this model have been given
in [12]. However, the static/crash-stop model does not cover the needs of a lot of
applications. We discuss here group communication in the static crash-recovery
model and in the dynamic crash-stop model.
Group Communication in the Crash-Recovery Model. In the crash-stop
model processes do not have access to stable storage. In such a model a pro-
cess that crashes loses all its state: upon recovery it cannot be distinguished
from a newly starting process. The crash-stop model is attractive from an eﬃ-
ciency point of view: no stable storage means no costly logging operation, i.e.,
more eﬃcient algorithms. However, the crash-stop model has also limitations.
Algorithms developed in this model do not tolerate the crash of all processes.
Moreover, access to stable storage is natural for many applications. This gives a
strong motivation to consider group communication in the crash-recovery model.
We consider here atomic broadcast.
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Atomic broadcast in the crash-recovery model has been considered in [19].
However, as we explain in [15], the speciﬁcation fails to capture the fundamental
diﬀerence between the crash-stop and the crash-recovery model. In the crash-
stop model there is no need to distinguish (1) the state of the application from
(2) the state of the group communication infrastructure (if processes do not re-
cover after a crash, the distinction is irrelevant). Indeed, in this case the two
states are always trivially synchronized. This is no more the case when processes
do recover. In this case the distinction—for each process—between application
state and group communication state, requires to synchronize the checkpointing
of these two parts of a process state. For this purpose we introduce a commit
primitive. Thus atomic broadcast is deﬁned in terms of the traditional abcast
primitive (used by the application to broadcast a message), the traditional ade-
liver primitive (by which the group communication infrastructure provides a
message to the application) and the new commit primitive. When executed by
the application, commit tells the following to the group communication infras-
tructure: the application state, up to the most recent event, is saved on stable
state. Implicitly, this leads the commit primitive to play two roles: (i) veto (e.g.,
no right to adeliver a message that was already adelivered before the commit),
and (ii) obligation (e.g., for another process to adeliver a message).
Rather than giving here a formal speciﬁcation of atomic broadcast in terms
of abcast, adeliver and commit, we give the intuition of the speciﬁcation on two
examples.
(i) Veto role of commit. Consider the following two sequences of events on
process p:
• Scenario 1: adeliverp(m); crashp; recoveryp; adeliverp(m);
• Scenario 2: adeliverp(m); commitp; crashp; recoveryp; adeliverp(m);
Scenario 1 is ok, but not Scenario 2. In Scenario 2, commit marks the point
at which p’s execution will resume after a crash. So m cannot be adelivered a
second time after recovery. The absence of commit in the ﬁrst scenario allows
m to be adelivered again after p’s recovery: the crash leads p to “forget” the
adelivery of m.
(ii) Obligation role of commit. Consider the following two sequences of events
on process p:
• Scenario 1: adeliverp(m); crashp; recoverp;
• Scenario 2: adeliverp(m); commitp; crashp; recoverp;
In Scenario 1, since p crashed after having adelivered m (i.e., the adelivery of
m is “forgotten”), no other process is obliged to adeliver m. In Scenario 2, the
execution of commit by p after the adelivery of m (i.e., upon recovery p “remem-
bers” having adelivered m), forces other processes q to adeliver m. Note that
the obligation is only on so-called good processes, i.e., processes that never crash
or processes that crash only a ﬁnite number of times and always recover after a
crash [5].
These two examples show that the execution of commit by process p makes
all preceding events on p become “permanent”. Without commit, events are
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volatile. The speciﬁcation of atomic broadcast in the crash-recovery model is
based on this distinction. The details can be found in [15]. A prototype has been
implemented in our Fortika group communication middleware (see Section 3).
Dynamic Group Communication. While the speciﬁcation of group commu-
nication in the crash-recovery model has been addressed only by few authors, the
speciﬁcation of dynamic group communication has received a lot of attention [9].
Nevertheless these speciﬁcations are not really satisfactory. The main problem is
that the speciﬁcations for dynamic groups are not close to the speciﬁcations for
static groups. Speciﬁcally, if we consider the speciﬁcations for dynamic groups
in the special case of a static group, we do not obtain the widely adopted static
speciﬁcations [12].
In the existing group communication speciﬁcations for dynamic groups, the
key component is the group membership service, which is responsible for adding
and removing processes to/from a group. Consider some group g. The successive
membership of g is modelled using the notion of view : the requirement on the
group membership is that it delivers the successive views of g to its members
in the same order. For example if v0(g) = {p, q, r} is the initial view of g,
and then the successive views are v1(g) = {p, q} and v2(g) = {p, q, s}, then all
processes see the membership changes in the same order. In the existing group
communication speciﬁcations for dynamic groups, the speciﬁcation of the group
communication service is used to specify the basic communication primitive,
called view synchronous broadcast or simply vscast. Vscast basically requires that
messages that are vscast are ordered with respect to view changes [9]. Finally,
atomic broadcast is deﬁned as vscast with an additional order property.
This might look similar to the speciﬁcation of atomic broadcast with static
groups, where atomic broadcast is deﬁned as reliable broadcast (or rbcast) with
an additional order property [21]. Unfortunately, when comparing the speciﬁ-
cations of (i) rbcast with static groups and (ii) vscast with dynamic groups,
it is hard to see their similarities. However, it is possible to specify dynamic
group communication such that the dynamic speciﬁcations reduce to the stan-
dard static speciﬁcations when the group membership does not change.
With static groups, the speciﬁcation distinguishes correct processes (that do
not crash) and faulty processes (that crash). The obligations (to deliver mes-
sages) are only on correct processes. With dynamic groups, the situation is
slightly diﬀerent. Consider a group g. The obligations (to deliver messages) must
only be on correct processes that are members of g. If some process crashes or
leaves g, its obligation with respect to g disappear. Symmetrically, if a process
joins g, it starts to have obligations with respect to g. This can be expressed by
the notion of g-correct process, derived from the notion of v-correct process [22].
Informally, process p is v-correct in some view v if p installs view v and does not
crash while its view is v; process p is g-correct if it is correct in the ﬁrst view of
g it belongs to, and in all successive views of g.
With the notion of v-correct and g-correct process we can deﬁne dynamic
reliable broadcast almost as (static) reliable broadcast. Reliable broadcast is
deﬁned by validity, uniform agreement and uniform integrity (for a deﬁnition
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of these properties, see [21]). Dynamic reliable broadcast can be deﬁned by (i)
the same uniform integrity property, (ii) slightly modiﬁed validity and uniform
agreement properties (correct must be replaced with g-correct or v-correct), and
(iii) a new uniform same view delivery property [22]:
– Uniform same view delivery: if two processes p and q deliver message m in
view vp (for p) and vq (for q), then vp = vq.
This speciﬁcation of dynamic reliable broadcast is a generalization of static
reliable broadcast: if the group is static, dynamic reliable broadcast reduces to
static reliable broadcast.
Dynamic atomic broadcast can then be deﬁned as dynamic reliable broadcast
with an additional total order property, which only slightly diﬀers from the
static total order property. Details can be found in [22], which also shows that
the group membership speciﬁcation can be trivially obtained from the dynamic
atomic broadcast speciﬁcation.
4.2 Proof-Oriented Speciﬁcation Style for Failure Detectors
The concept of unreliable failure detectors was introduced by Chandra and
Toueg [8] as a means to add weak forms of synchrony into asynchronous systems,
mostly of the crash-stop model mentioned in the previous Section 4.1. Various
kinds of such failure detectors, as we also use in the group communication ar-
chitecture of Figure 2, have been identiﬁed as each being the weakest to solve
some speciﬁc distributed programming problem [7]. Here, we provide—for the
purpose of speciﬁcation—a fresh look at the concept of failure detectors from
the point of view of programming languages, using the formal tool of operational
semantics, with the goal of bringing it closer to our formal reasoning techniques
(see Section 5.1).
According to Chandra and Toueg [8], at any given time t ∈ T, the failure
detector (FD) of some process outputs a list of (names of) processes that it cur-
rently suspects to have crashed. As mentioned in Section 3, FDs are unreliable:
they may make mistakes, they may disagree among themselves, and they may
even change their mind indeﬁnitely often.
In Table 1, we propose a uniform speciﬁcation scheme—based on a two-layered
transition system—to describe the operational semantics of process networks in
the context of failure detectors. One layer describes—by separate sets of rules—
both the transitions N −→ N ′ of process networks (here, left unspeciﬁed to
keep the setting parametric, but should be derived from the description of the
algorithm) and the transitions Γ −→ Γ ′ of the network’s environment (keeping
track of crashes and providing failure detection, as indicated by rule (env)). A
process i in a network carries out essentially two kinds of transitions N −→ N ′,
distinguished by whether it requires the suspicion of some process j by process i,
or not. Formally, we use labels suspectj@i and τ@i to indicate these two kinds.
Another layer, with the rules (tau) and (suspect), deals exclusively with the
compatibility of network and environment transitions, conveniently focusing on
the environment conditions for the two kinds of transitions of process networks.
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Table 1. Uniform “Abstract” Operational Semantics Scheme
(env)
“ failure detection events happens in the environment ”
Γ −→ Γ ′
(tau)
Γ −→ Γ ′ N τ@i−−−−→ N ′ “ i not crashed in Γ ”
Γ  N −→ Γ ′  N ′
(suspect)
Γ −→ Γ ′ N suspectj@i−−−−−−−−−→ N ′
“ i not crashed in Γ ” “ j may be suspected by i in Γ ”
Γ  N −→ Γ ′  N ′
For example, the boxed condition exploits the failure detector information that
in our scheme is to be provided via the environment component Γ .
Runs are sequences of system transitions, as derivable by operational seman-
tics rules. A process is correct in a given run, if it does not crash in this run.
Chandra and Toueg speciﬁed FDs by means of failure patterns F : T → 2P
and failure detector histories H : T × P → 2P. We refer to the respective runs as
T-runs, since time T lies at the core of the statically ﬁxed components F and H .
This (F,H)-based model is easily reformulated in our two-layered scheme [17].
Probably the main novelty of Chandra and Toueg’s paper [8] was the deﬁni-
tion and study of a number of FDs that only diﬀer in their degree of reliability,
as expressed by a combination of safety and liveness properties. These are formu-
lated in terms of permitted and enforced suspicions according to the respective
failures reported in F and the failure detection recorded in H :
completeness addresses crashed processes that must be suspected
by (the FDs of) “complete” processes.
accuracy addresses correct processes that must not be suspected
by (the FDs of) “accurate” processes.
These properties are implicitly quantiﬁed for all possible runs. The words “com-
plete” and “accurate” processes indicate some ﬂexibility in the deﬁnition of the
set of processes that the property shall be imposed on. Many instantiations of
completeness and accuracy have been proposed.
Inspired by the FD called Ω [7], we observed that the common principle
behind the (F,H)-based notions of accuracy is that of “justiﬁed trust”. The key
role is played by correct processes—those that, according to F , were immortal
in the given run—that are trusted forever (according to H) in the given run,
either eventually or already from the very beginning. In a dynamic operational
semantics scenario, as opposed to the static view of (F,H), we rather model the
moment when such a process becomes forever trusted. Dynamically, however, we
must also ensure this process not to crash afterwards—it must become immortal
at this very moment. We call such a process trusted-immortal.
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Table 2. Operational Semantics Scheme with Reliable Information
(D-env)
(TI ∪ TI) ∩ C = ∅ (C ∪ C) ∩ TI = ∅ |C ∪ C| ≤ maxfail(n)
(TI,C) −→ (TI unionmulti TI,C unionmulti C)
(D-tau)
(TI,C) = Γ −→ Γ ′ N τ@i−−−−→ N ′ i 	∈ C
Γ  N −→ Γ ′  N ′
(X -suspect)
(TI,C) = Γ −→ Γ ′ N
suspectj@i−−−−−−−−−→ N ′ i 	∈ C conditionX (Γ, j)
Γ  N −→ Γ ′  N ′
Note, here, that our treatment of trusted immortals is to be seen in the very
same way as Chandra and Toueg’s treatment of (F,H): the ultimate goal is to
provide some mathematical device to specify (not: implement) in retrospective
view “what may have happened” in an acceptable run according to FD-sensitive
information. They ﬁx this information statically, while we allow it to develop
dynamically and, by that, we can simplify the style of speciﬁcation.
With this idea, we proposed a new model [17] capable to represent all of the
FDs of [8] solely based on information that is not ﬁxed before a run starts, but is
dynamically appearing along its way. It turns out that two kinds of information
suﬃce: (1) which processes have crashed, and (2) which processes have become
trusted-immortal. Both kinds of information may occur at any moment in time,
but they remain irrevocable in any continuation of the current run.
In Table 2, environments Γ = (TI,C) record sets TI of trusted-immortal pro-
cesses and sets C of crashed processes. Rule (D-env) precisely models their non-
deterministic appearance in full generality: in a single step, an environment may
be increased by further trusted-immortal processes (∈TI) or crashed processes
(∈C). Rule (D-tau) permits actions τ@i if i ∈ C. Rule (X -suspect) requires in
addition that the suspected process j is permitted to be suspected by Γ , depends
on the FD accuracy that we intend to model.
Our D-representations of FDs are proved extensionally equivalent with the
T-representations proposed in [8] via mutual “inclusion” of their sets of runs.
Essentially, this works by looking for a mutual simulation of T-runs and D-runs
sharing the same network run (by projecting onto the N -component). In general,
proofs using the new instead of the old representation are considerably simpler.
5 Veriﬁcation and Testing
Veriﬁcation and testing are complementary, but equally important aspects. Up
to now, in our new architecture, we have focused on two aspects: the formal
veriﬁcation of the consensus component, based on an operational semantics, and
the experimental validation of the Fortika group communication stack, through
the technique of fault injection. While the formal veriﬁcation seeks to prove
that a consensus component does precisely what it should, the experimental
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validation seeks to “stress-test” the robustness of a component by confronting
with environment conditions that go beyond what it should be able to cope with.
5.1 Formal Veriﬁcation of the Consensus Component
As pointed out in Section 3.2, consensus is a fundamental component that plays
a basic role in the new architecture. The properties it provides to the above
components are:
1. Validity: If a process decides a value v, then v was proposed by some process.
2. Agreement : No two correct processes decide diﬀerently.
3. Termination: Every correct process (eventually) decides some value.
Any correct implementation of the consensus component must guarantee the
respect of these three properties. Since consensus is one of the basic building
blocks of the new group communication stack (see Figure 2(b)), the correctness of
its implementation is fundamental for the stability of the whole new architecture.
Many algorithms are available to implement the consensus component. This
variety is due to the existence of diﬀerent models (of communication, of fail-
ure, etc) and the necessity of taking advantage of the properties provided by
underlying components. A common trait of many of these algorithms is that
they are described in pseudo code—i.e., with neither formal syntax nor formal
semantics—and the proofs of their correctness are given informally, with brief
argumentations expressed in natural language. Thus, the pseudo code sometimes
leaves space to interpretation and the correctness proofs sometimes require the
readers to actually prove themselves substantial parts or subresults for which
only informal arguments were given. To convincingly argue for the stability and
correctness of the whole architecture, we consider it vital to rely on a consensus
implementation that has been proved correct formally.
Given the model in which our architecture was placed (reliable communica-
tion, crash failure) and given the presence of failure detectors, the algorithm
that we chose to implement the consensus component was the one proposed by
Chandra and Toueg in [8]. This algorithm makes use of reliable broadcast and
failure detector abstractions. It also assumes a majority of correct processes.
Before explaining the algorithm, it is worth here to brieﬂy clarify the meaning
of the terms Quasi-reliable Point-to-Point and Reliable Broadcast abstractions
that we will use in our description. Both Quasi-reliable Point-to-Point and Re-
liable Broadcast are components that lie in what we call Network layer (Figure
2). As their name suggest, they are (quasi) reliable in that they guarantee the re-
ception and non-corruption of messages sent by correct processes. Quasi-reliable
Point-to-Point takes care of messages exchanged between two processes, while
Reliable Broadcast distributes messages to all the correct processes in a group.
Since the implementation of these two components does not inﬂuence the consen-
sus algorithm, in our study we represent them as abstractions providing speciﬁc
features and properties. Now everything is in place to describe the Chandra-
Toueg consensus algorithm.
The Chandra-Toueg algorithm (Figure 3) proceeds in rounds and is based
on the rotating coordinator paradigm: for each round number, a single process
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Fig. 3. A round in the Chandra-Toueg consensus algorithm
is predetermined to play a coordinator role, while all other processes in this
round play the role of participants. Each of the n processes holds a local round
counter and, at any time, knows who the coordinator of its current round is. For
every round, each participant sends its current value to the coordinator of this
round. The coordinator chooses one of the proposals it has received and sends
it to all participants. These, in turn, are supposed to acknowledge the receipt.
If the coordinator receives a majority of positive acknowledgments, it reliably
broadcasts the value to all participants: this is going to be the decision. If a
participant is not able to receive the coordinator proposal while waiting for it,
and if the underlying failure detector component allows, then this participant
may instead suspect the coordinator to have crashed. In this case, the participant
sends a negative acknowledgement and moves to the next round, sending the very
same value of the previous round to the new coordinator.
Correctness of the algorithm means that its resulting runs—more precisely:
all runs satisfying the requirements on the underlying communication and coor-
dination services—satisfy the three Consensus properties. In [8], Chandra and
Toueg also provide sketches of proofs (written in natural language) of Validity,
Agreement and Termination.
Such proofs make heavy reference to the concept of round. However, there is
nothing like the global round number of a reachable global state in a system run.
A round is only a local concept, and no relation between runs and asynchronous
rounds is ever properly clariﬁed. We consider this as problematic.
Moreover, there are two main reasons that make us argue against the approach
of using only pseudo code. The ﬁrst one is that the algorithm is not suﬃciently
complete. In fact, it describes only local behavior of processes and does not
include any representation of the network. Also, the involved data structures are
underspeciﬁed. In particular, there is almost no description of how and where the
messages are buﬀered when waiting to be sent and once they have been received.
The second reason is that, due to the absence of a precise formal semantics in the
pseudo code, the algorithm description does not oﬀer an unambiguous derivation
of runs from the code. This is crucial because the speciﬁcation of correctness
properties is exclusively based on the notion of system runs. More precisely, it
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is based on runs of the full distributed system, including the point-to-point and
broadcast messages that are buﬀered within the network, as well as the behavior
of the failure detector mechanism.
For these reasons, the proofs would proﬁt much from the introduction of global
knowledge on:
– system states and their past, which could provide us with precise information
about which processes have been in which round in the past and what they
precisely did when they were there;
– broadcast messages, which could provide us with precise information about
what values are the chosen ones and about the processes that already know
such values and the ones that still ignore them;
– point-to-point messages, which could provide us with precise information
about what messages are ready to be sent but would still be lost in the case
of a crash of the sender, what messages are about to be received and cannot
be lost any longer should their original sender crash, what messages have
already been received thus probably inﬂuencing the following behavior of
their receiver.
Thus, in our work [18], we provide a mathematical structure that describes
the global idealized run-time system comprising all processes and the network.
Moreover, in order to simplify the proofs, our structure also plays the role of a
system history, never forgetting any information during the computation.
Formally, the consensus algorithm is speciﬁed in terms of inference rules that
deﬁne computation steps as transitions between conﬁgurations of the form:
some condition
Γ  〈B,Q,S 〉 −→ Γ ′  〈B′,Q′,S′ 〉
Γ is the environment component, presented in Section 4.2, that records sets TI
of trusted-immortal processes and sets C of crashed processes. B contains the
(histories of) messages sent during the execution of the algorithm through the
Reliable Broadcast service. Q contains the (histories of) messages sent during
the execution of the algorithm through the Quasi-reliable Point-to-Point service.
S models the state of the n processes. We can access the current state of each
single process using its identiﬁer, i.e. S(i) is the current state of process i.
The condition for the execution of the rule is usually a condition on the
state of a particular process and on the messages that such process has received
up to that point. For example, “process i should be in a waiting state and
the message containing the coordinator proposal should not ﬁgure among the
messages received by i”. The condition can also be extended with requirements
on the environment component. For example, “the coordinator of round r should
not be in the TI set”. The execution of the rule modiﬁes the contents of (some of)
the structures. For example, the state of process i changes and a new message
is sent, or broadcast.
As mentioned also in Section 4.2, runs are considered as sequences of system
transitions derivable by operational semantics rules. In this way we can generate
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all, and only, the runs that would be possible if we were executing the algorithm
in reality. We can study such runs examining what happens step by step and
verifying claims on the overall execution. The proofs of the properties of consen-
sus are therefore made by showing that all the sequences of system transitions
derivable by the given operational semantics rules, that represent all the possible
runs generated by the algorithm, satisfy Validity, Agreement and Termination.
Summing up, in order to counter the observed incompleteness of the algorithm
description in pseudo-code format, we have developed appropriate description
techniques that incorporate the lacking information; also, in order to counter
the observed ambiguity due to the lack of precise semantics of the pseudo-code
with respect to the underlying system model, we have built the algorithm upon
a formal description. We have then deﬁned runs as sequential executions of the
semantics rules and have kept track of the changes induced by the application of
such rules in the B, Q and S structures. With this apparatus, we have eventually
all the formal means for reasoning on rounds, as well as on time and on messages
sent/in-transit/received, thus the proofs of correctness of the algorithm are now
much more detailed, rigorous and credible.
5.2 Testing the Robustness of Fortika
Fault injection is a well-known technique to assess a system’s resilience to error
conditions. In a joint work with the University of Illinois [13], we set up an error-
injection testbed in order to study how Fortika (see Section 3.2) reacts to data
corruption. We carried out several error injection campaigns, which performed
thousands of error injections, consisting in ﬂipping a random bit in main mem-
ory or in a network message. It is important to point out that Fortika has been
designed with a benign-fault model in mind, that is, only crash faults were con-
sidered (see Section 4.1). The memory and network corruption errors addressed
in these experiments go far beyond the model’s assumptions. Thus, our goals
were not to ﬁnd out whether Fortika is resilient to these faults, but rather to
analize (and later minimize) any unacceptable behavior of the system.
Memory Injections. We performed a preliminary injection campaign for each
memory segment: code (errors directly injected into the executed code), stack
(local variables altered), and heap (allocated variables dynamically corrupted).
The most important result from these experiments was the high frequency of
partial process crashes. In many experiments (26% for stack injections) the sys-
tem completely hung. Further analysis showed that multithreading was behind
such system-wide hangs: quite often, an error injection threw a Java runtime
exception; the Java Virtual Machine stopped the oﬀending thread, but let the
others continue execution. We call this partial crash: some threads were working
but some were not (e.g., the injected process could be sending heartbeats but
omitting other messages). We enhanced the design of Fortika to cope with mem-
ory corruption and avoid partial crashes (as well as other problems, see details
in [13]). Table 3 summarizes the results of memory injections for the improved
Fortika design. This table shows the low rate of executions with unacceptable
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behavior (between 0% and 6%) with respect to total manifested errors, which are
deﬁned as errors that visibly aﬀect the system behavior (though not necessarily
causing an incorrect execution).
Table 3. Memory injection results after im-
proving Fortika
Memory Injected Manifested Unacceptable∗
Segment Errors Errors Behavior
Heap 15177 1221 0
Text
libjava.so 1000 616 36 (5.8%)
libjvm.so 910 269 7 (2.6%)
libnet.so 755 215 2 (1%)
Stack 5509 1825 109 (6.0%)
Table 4. Network injection re-
sults after improving Fortika
Total injected errors 1062
Manifested errors∗ 625
Message not detected
a) No propagation 76 (12%)
b) Propagation 6 ( 1%)
∗ Percentages with respect to manifested errors are shown in parentheses.
Network Injections. In the network injection campaigns, an incoming message
is altered (after checksum veriﬁcation), thus resulting in an invalid input to
the process. The goal is to analyze how far can an incorrect message get into
the receiving process, and how badly it can aﬀect the system. Most Fortika
messages contain marshalled Java objects, thus, the desirable behavior is that
Java unmarshalling routines detect and block incorrect messages.
A preliminary injection campaign evidenced a fairly high rate of incorrectly
unmarshalled messages: up to 25% for certain messages types. In these experi-
ments, the unmarshalling routines were unable to detect the corrupted message
and allocated incorrect objects in memory. Further analysis showed that compat-
ibility between diﬀerent versions of the same Java class, a core feature of standard
Java serialization, seriously harms robustness against corrupted messages. In the
same way as with memory injections, we revised the design of Fortika in order to
better react to incorrectly unmarshalled messages. The injection results for the
new design are shown in Table 4, where we can see that only 13% of corrupted
messages are not detected during unmarshalling, and sneack into the receiving
process. Even in those cases, we see that the error seldom propagates to other
processes (1% of all manifested errors).
6 Conclusion
We started from the goal to improve the state of the art of group communi-
cation by having groups with complementary scientiﬁc backgrounds—possibly
characterized as distributed computing, programming languages and concur-
rency theory—join their forces. By now, we have already managed to achieve a
number of interesting individual results that witness the potential for successful
collaboration. Although much more work remains to be done, we consider our
project as a promising ﬁrst concrete step towards formally deﬁned and veriﬁed
implementations of ﬂexibly reusable group communication middleware.
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